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YES, THE SENATE ELEVATED PARTISAN POLITICAL GOALS OVER 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT WHEN IT REFUSED TO CONSIDER 
PRESIDENT OBAMA’S NOMINEE TO REPLACE JUSTICE SCALIA 
Peter J. Eckerstrom* 
To understand the narrow scope of Seth Barrett Tillman’s critique of my 
article,1 The Garland Nomination, the Senate’s Duty, and the Surprising Lessons of 
Constitutional Text,2 the reader must understand the scale of my thesis.  
Therein, I analyze whether the Senate has a constitutional duty to 
meaningfully consider presidential nominees to the United States Supreme 
Court.  To gain analytical traction on that problem, I identify those powers 
the 114th Senate secured over the appointment process when it asserted the 
authority to refuse consideration: 
[T]he Senate . . . [expressly] claimed authority under the Appointments 
Clause to decline consideration of any nominee of an individual President 
based on factors such as (1) the Senate’s perception of the importance of the 
appointment or (2) the political features of its timing.  A Senate that claims 
those powers captures the authority to indefinitely halt the appointment 
process, to shift the appointment power to a subsequent President, and even 
to unilaterally reduce the size of the Court upon the emergence of a vacancy.  
Moreover, a Senate that claims the threshold power to decide who will be 
considered functionally usurps part of the President’s nomination power 
itself.3 
I then review the controlling constitutional text to evaluate the legitimacy of 
those claims.4  I conduct that review in conformity with traditional canons 
for understanding text, frequently using Justice Scalia’s own definitive 
treatise as a guide.5  And, I conclude that the text of the Appointments 
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 1 Seth Barrett Tillman, On the Senate’s Purported Constitutional Duty to Meaningfully Consider Presidential 
Nominees to the Supreme Court of the United States:  A Response to Chief Judge Peter J. Eckerstrom, 21 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 879 (2019). 
 2 Peter J. Eckerstrom, The Garland Nomination, the Senate’s Duty, and the Surprising Lessons of Constitutional 
Text, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 33 (2018). 
 3 Id. at 35. 
 4 Id at 40–55. 
 5 Id. at 38 n.13, 39 n.16, 42 n.31, 48 n.45–47, 50 n.51, 51 n.57, 52 n.61, 69 n.117. 
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Clause, and the purposes conveyed by that language, cannot be harmonized 
with the Senate’s express and implicit claims of authority.6 
I provide five reasons why the Senate’s claim of authority defies the 
Constitution’s distribution of powers between the branches: 
[T]he 114th Senate’s misreading of its textual authority under the Advice 
and Consent Clause: (1) compromises the President’s exclusive power to 
select nominees; (2) contradicts the evident purpose of the Appointments 
Clause as conveyed by its text (the mandatory and prompt appointment of 
important governmental functionaries); (3) bypasses the Constitution’s 
express prescription for how the size of the Court may be altered; (4) 
overlooks constitutional limitations on the Senate’s rule-making authority; 
and (5) cripples one of the intended constitutional checks on the Senate’s 
power over the appointment process.7 
I also observe more generally that the Framers’ placement of the 
Appointments Clause in Article II, Section 2 (rather than in Article I or, more 
neutrally, in Article III), coupled with the sparse and dependent language of 
the Advice and Consent Clause, contradicts any textual claim that the Senate 
was tacitly endowed with dominant authority over the appointments 
process.8  Finally, I review founding-era understandings of the Appointments 
Clause held by the Constitution’s most prominent drafters, explicators, and 
opponents.9  That inquiry corroborates my thesis that the Appointments 
Clause was designed to provide the President, not the Senate, primary and 
dominant authority over the appointments process. 
Mr. Tillman takes issue with but one of those arguments, an argument 
neither original to my article nor necessary to accept my thesis: I contend, 
inter alia, that the text of the Appointments Clause sets forth a three-step 
process for filling important government posts: nomination, Senate 
consideration (through advice and consent), and appointment.10  The first 
and third of those steps are expressly obligatory: the President “shall 
nominate” and “shall appoint.”11  For this reason, I posit that the second 
step—Senate consideration—must be implicitly mandatory as well.12  That 
argument is anchored in the semantic meaning of the word “shall,” 




 6 Id. at 67–68. 
 7 Id. at 37. 
 8 Id. at 37–38. 
 9 Id. at 58–67. 
 10 Id. at 42. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 43. 
 13 Id. at 45–46. 
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Mr. Tillman first wages a jurisprudential challenge.  Tillman finds 
reasoning by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison that, he maintains, 
contradicts the notion that the Appointments Clause creates any obligation 
on the President to fill vacancies.14  Although Tillman chides my thesis for 
overlooking such a prominent case,15 Tillman himself overlooks the plain 
context of Justice Marshall’s reasoning.  In the segments quoted by Tillman, 
Marshall analyzes whether a person who has been lawfully nominated and 
appointed by the President for a lesser governmental post, but has not 
received his commission from the Secretary of State, has been lawfully 
installed in that position.16 
To address that question, Marshall compares those Article II 
appointment powers the President enjoys independent from congressional 
influence to those that the President must execute in compliance with 
congressional directive.17  To this end, Marshall identifies a distinction 
between those officials the President has the exclusive power to nominate and 
appoint without any congressional delegation of appointment authority 
(those officials specifically itemized in the Appointments Clause), and those 
“inferior officers” as to whom Congress maintains authority to specify the 
appointing entity.18  Marshall makes this distinction to evaluate whether, and 
under what circumstances, a President has an Article II, Section 3 duty to 
“commission all the officers of the United States.”19 
In context, then, when Marshall states that the President’s power to 
nominate is “the sole act of the President” and “completely voluntary,”20 he 
is addressing not whether the constitutional text obligates the President to fill 
the itemized important governmental posts (an issue not before the Court in 
Marbury), but rather whether the President has the exclusive power to 
nominate independent of any congressional role.  Notably, in the next 
sentence, when Marshall similarly describes the President’s appointment 
power itself as an exclusive, voluntary act, he qualifies that “it can only be 
performed by and with the advice and consent of the senate.”21 
To put it bluntly, Marshall does not purport to address the question 
relevant to my thesis: whether the semantically mandatory language of 
 
 14 Tillman, supra note 1, at 881–82. 
 15 Id. at 881 (“[A] judge on some multi-member appellate court—albeit, not a particularly well-known 
judge—albeit, not a particularly well-known court—once addressed this precise issue in a case that 
is no longer quite rightly remembered.”). 
 16 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 155–56 (1803). 
 17 Id. at 156. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 155. 
 21 Id. 
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Article II, Section 2 imposes an express duty on the President, and an implied 
duty on the Senate, to take the actions necessary to fill important 
governmental vacancies.  This explains why those constitutional scholars, 
who previously made the same point as mine, did not address Marshall’s 
reasoning.22 
Mr. Tillman also makes a more pertinent and sophisticated argument 
that the meaning of the word “shall” in the Appointments Clause is unclear.23  
But he fails to rebut the most powerful evidence demonstrating the drafters’ 
semantic intentions.  As I explain, Article II, Section 2 calibrates the level of 
presidential discretion attached to each of the numerous executive powers 
itemized therein.24  Thus, one must overlook the structure and context of the 
language immediately surrounding the Appointments Clause to contend that 
the Framers used “shall” casually or imprecisely therein.  Indeed, elsewhere 
in Article II, the drafters demonstrated themselves capable of using the word 
“will” to denote an expectation of future action and “may” to indicate 
discretionary action.25 
Mr. Tillman’s challenge to my thesis—wherein he maintains that 
intellectual integrity requires that I respond to his above critiques—invites a 
challenge to his own.  Those who, like Tillman, (1) maintain that Originalism 
transcends other forms of constitutional and textual interpretation in assuring 
fidelity to the rule of law,26 (2) laud Justice Scalia as the most articulate and 
powerful advocate of that view, and (3) recognize that Justice Scalia’s 
replacement would determine the mode of interpretation embraced by the 
majority of the Supreme Court for a generation, must also answer some 
questions. 
In refusing to allow a validly elected President to fill Justice Scalia’s 
vacancy on the Supreme Court, did the 114th Senate make any serious effort 
to abide by the textualist and originalist principles of constitutional 
interpretation for which it had eulogized Justice Scalia?27  When that 
Senate’s leadership claimed broad authority to dominate the appointments 
 
 22 See Tillman, supra note 1, at 882 n.12 (identifying other scholars who have recognized the mandatory 
nature of the President’s Article II appointment powers). 
 23 Id. at 7–10. 
 24 Eckerstrom, supra note 2, at 46. 
 25 Id. at 46 & n.39. 
26  See J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE 
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE, 40–44 (Geoffrey R. Stone ed., 2012) 
(describing the quest for interpretive constraints as an animating premise for originalist doctrine as 
articulated by Robert Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia and observing specifically that “[t]his 
constraining force . . . is the basis of its appeal . . . .”). 
 27 The historical record suggests not.  Within an hour of notice of Justice Scalia’s death, Senator Mitch 
McConnell, the Senate Majority Leader, announced that the Senate would not allow President 
Obama to replace Scalia.  See Eckerstrom, supra note 2, at 40 & n.25. 
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process, did it conduct any searching analysis of Article II, Section 2 to find 
even a scrap of express language affirmatively supporting its unprecedented 
assertion of power?  Conversely, did the Senate consider whether that novel 
claim of authority could be harmonized with the express text of the 
Appointments Clause and the evident purposes of that text?28 
My thesis makes a comprehensive case from the text of Article II, 
reinforced by founding-era understandings of that text, that the 114th Senate 
violated constitutional design when it refused to consider any person 
nominated by President Obama to replace Justice Scalia.  My thesis suggests 
that a Senate majority, which praised Justice Scalia for his commitment to 
abide by constitutional text, elevated partisan political goals over any 
conscientious effort to comply with the express and implicit constitutional 
directive found in the Appointments Clause.  Given the gravity of that 
conclusion to a core originalist claim—that their professed theory of 
interpretation most effectively constrains politically motivated constructions 




















 28 This should not be a trivial question for a disciplined originalist.  See Amy Coney Barrett & John 
Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (2016) (observing that “[t]he 
conventional position of modern originalists, however, is that the original public meaning of the 
Constitution’s text is ‘the law.’  The consequence of that position is that the original public meaning 
of the Constitution binds the legislators who swear to uphold it.”). 
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